



There are many considerations when designing a key-management system with a TPM. 
If keys are going to be used for critical operations, such as encryption or identification, 
it’s vital that an architecture be used to provide a standard means of managing the key’s 
lifetime and prepare for problems if hardware breaks. Such an architecture must be able 
to handle key generation, key distribution, key backup, and key destruction. The design 
of the TPM was architected with these things in mind. This chapter describes the various 
options possible for these steps in a key’s life.
Key Generation
When generating a key, the most important thing the user has to consider is that the key 
be generated randomly. If a poor random number generator is chosen, the key that is 
picked won’t be secure. The second most important thing to consider is keeping the key 
material confidential. TPMs are designed to be secure against software-based threats. 
Hardware threats can be protected against by the manufacturer, but that isn’t part of the 
design per se. However, the design does allow for key split creation of keys, where entropy 
used to generate a key is stored in both in and outside the TPM, so that when the TPM 
isn’t in use, keys remain secure even with physical access.
There are three ways that keys can come to reside in a TPM. They can be generated 
from a seed, generated using a random number generator in the TPM, or imported. 
Primary keys are generated using a seed that exists in the TPM. The seed used for 
generating the EK is associated with the Endorsement hierarchy and isn’t likely to be one 
that the end user can change.
The seed associated with the storage hierarchy, on the other hand, changes 
whenever a TPM_Clear command is issued. This can be done either via the BIOS, which 
uses the platform hierarchy authorization, or by the end user using the dictionary-attack 
reset password.
As stated in Chapter 10, primary keys are generated using a FIPS-approved key 
derivation function (KDF), which hashes together the primary seed together with a key 
template. The template for key generation is in two parts. The first part is a description of 
the kind of key to generate—whether it’s a signing key or an encryption key, asymmetric 
or symmetric, what type of signing scheme it uses if it’s a signing key, the algorithm and 
key size, and so on. The other part is a place where entropy can be introduced to the 
command to be used in generating the key. In most cases, the second part is set to all 
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zeros (as in the TCG Infrastructure Work Group’s published EK template). However, if the 
user doesn’t trust the entropy generator in the TPM, they can use this facility to provide a 
key split.
A key split is a cryptographic construct where two sets of entropy—each with as 
much entropy as the final key—are used to produce a key. Neither one alone is able to 
provide even a single bit of the final key’s entropy—both are necessary. Thus, one can be 
held separate from the TPM, and one held inside the TPM.
In case of a primary key, one split of the key is the hierarchy’s seed, inside the TPM. 
The other, which can be stored securely when not in use (for example, in a smart card or 
safe) is held outside the TPM in the template.
Primary storage keys have an associated symmetric key which is generated when 
the primary key is generated and is associated with it. This is also derived from the 
primary seed and introduces entropy. As long as the seed associated with a hierarchy isn’t 
changed, using the same template will generate the same primary key and associated 
symmetric key. Because both the primary key and the symmetric key use the template in 
generation, if entropy is introduced there, the entropy in the template also acts as a key 
split for them.
Why would anyone split a key? The main reason is usually that the user is worried 
that it might be possible for someone to get hold of one of the two key splits. Either 
they’re worried that the TPM’s seed was squirted into the TPM at manufacturing time and 
someone still has a copy, or they’re worried that someone will de-layer the TPM, as was 
done with an Infineon 1.2 chip years ago.1 These attacks are mostly worries for the truly 
paranoid—the Infineon attack was successful only after destroying a handful of TPMs, 
and at a cost of over $200,000. But people in the security space tend to be paranoid types.
Generating a primary key can either take a relatively long time (if the key is an 
RSA key) or be virtually instantaneous (if it’s an ECC key.) If the key takes a long time to 
generate (or if the secret entropy introduced in its generation isn’t generally available), 
then the user may decide to store the key in the persistent memory of the TPM using the 
TPM2_EvictControl command, which requires the associated hierarchy’s authorization. 
In this case, the key is given a persistent handle, and a power cycle doesn’t affect the 
presence of the key in the TPM. It can be evicted with the same command. Depending on 
what attacks a user is worried about, the user may or may not decide to make their key 
persistent.
If a user is worried that the TPM seed has been compromised, then they’re worried 
that primary keys may be compromised. If the primary key is compromised, all keys 
stored using the primary key are also compromised. In this case, the user can use a key 
split to introduce their own entropy into primary keys via the template, make the key 
persistent, and then escrow the key’s template somewhere where an attacker can’t get it. 
This prevents an attacker who knows the TPM’s seed (generated at manufacturing time) 
from being able to determine the secrets of the primary key.
1William Jackson, “Engineer Shows How to Crack a ‘Secure’ TPM Chip,” GCN, February 2, 2010, 
http://gcn.com/articles/2010/02/02/black-hat-chip-crack-020210.aspx.
Chapter 15 ■ Key ManageMent
251
Alternatively, a primary key can be generated and used only to create another 
storage key child of the primary key. The storage key is then loaded into the TPM under 
the primary key of the TPM. The new child storage key is then made persistent. This 
key behaves similarly to a TPM 1.2 SRK. It’s generated by the TPM’s random number 
generator, not from the seed. However, it exists in encrypted form for a short period of 
time outside the TPM after it’s created, but before it’s reloaded—which results in a slight 
risk of attack if the primary key were compromised.
If a user is worried about physical attacks against the TPM, they may wish to use 
entropy encoded into the key’s template in a second factor and present that entropy each 
time the primary seed is to be generated, but not store the primary key in the TPM. (If 
the primary key is stored persistently, then a physical attack may be able to recover it.) 
In this case, each time the TPM is power cycled, all traces of the primary key disappear 
from the TPM. This is of course hard to manage, because the template must be kept secret 
(possibly in a USB key), separate from the TPM, and then introduced each time the key is 
to be loaded into the TPM.
Similarly, for the truly paranoid, who not only are worried about the TPM seed but 
also don’t trust the TPM’s random number generator, an external key can be generated 
by a trusted entropy source and then wrapped so that it can be imported into the TPM by 
a primary (or any storage) key (generated with entropy that is later discarded) and made 
persistent; and then the primary key is evicted. If additionally this person is worried 
about their system being stolen and the TPM de-layered to reveal its secrets, they should 
not make keys persistent in the TPM, but rather should redo this complicated loading of a 
key every time they power on the TPM.
USE CASE: CREATION OF DIFFERENT SRKS FOR DIFFERENT USERS
If a system has several users, they may want to have completely different sets of 
keys. If this is the case, they may all generate their own SrKs (individual primary 
restricted storage keys). this is easily possible if they each use different entropy 
in their template when creating their primary seed to use as their SrK. In order 
to make sure the same key isn’t generated for each user, the templates used to 
generate the keys must be distinct. For example, they could use the hash of a user 
secret as entropy in the key’s template. however, different users might pick the 
same user secret. It’s probably better to have the tpM use its hardware random 
number generator to create a key under the SrK for each user.
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THE RULE OF THUMB
there are only three reasons to make a key persistent. the key may be an rSa key 
and hence may take an unreasonably long time to re-generate, the key may be one 
created using a secret entropy source in the template that isn’t always available, 
or there may not be enough (or any) persistent memory outside the tpM to store a 
key template. the last may be the case if the tpM is being used in a constrained 
environment, such as during a boot cycle. In any other case, a key should be 
generated as necessary. this is different from the 1.2 design, because in a 2.0 
design, key loading is done with symmetric decryption and hence is very quick.
Templates
There are standard templates for creating keys, and generally it makes sense to use those 
rather than create your own. Templates typically use matched algorithm strengths. The 
one time you might not use matched algorithm strengths is when choosing the symmetric 
key. Because the symmetric key is used for loading other keys into the TPM rather than 
the asymmetric key, it’s possible to design a system where a symmetric key with a higher 
strength than the asymmetric key is used for the primary key. Once this is done, no keys 
generated on the TPM are exposed to the weakness of the asymmetric key or algorithm.
Key Trees: Keeping Keys in a Tree with the Same 
Algorithm Set
Although it’s technically possible to mix algorithms—make a key with one set of 
algorithms and then store it under a key with a different set of algorithms—it’s a bad 
practice (and one, as you have seen, that the TSS Feature Application Programming 
Interface [FAPI] won’t allow.) The problem is that the strength of a set of keys is dictated 
by the strength of the weakest key in a chain. This means not only should algorithm sets 
not be mixed, but chains of keys (with one key wrapping another one) should generally 
be kept fairly short. If any key in a chain is broken, then all keys below it are broken. So a 
key chain of four keys is four times weaker than a chain with one link when exposed to a 
brute force attack. (Of course, given a reasonable key size, a factor of 4 is unimportant.)
The reason you might decide to have a longer chain is manageability. A user may 
want to migrate their entire set of keys or a subset of those keys from one system to 
another system, or duplicate their set of keys among two or more computers. In order to 
make this easy, it’s likely that the user will wish to rewrap only one key—at the top of a 
tree of keys—with the public key on a different system and then copy the encrypted blobs 
that represent their other keys to the appropriate location in the other system.
You might want to keep enterprise keys separate from personal keys, and different 
department keys separate in an enterprise, as shown in Figure 15-1. Nevertheless, it’s best 
to keep key trees as short as possible.
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Duplication
In the key tree in Figure 15-1, the keys that might be duplicated are the Personal Key, the 
Enterprise Key, the Financial Keys (both Personal and Enterprise), the Entertainment 
Key, or the HR Key. In order to do this, all of these keys must be created to be duplicable, 
and they must have a policy created for them that has TPM2_Policy_CommandCode 
with TPM2_Duplicate selected (along with whatever restrictions are associated with 
duplicating a key). In most cases, a user creates two different duplication policies—one 
for personal keys and one for business keys—and associates those policies with a parent 
personal duplicable key (PDK) and a business duplicable key (BDK).
If a key isn’t going to be duplicated, it can be made fixedParent. If a key under the 
SDK or UDK is going to be duplicated apart from the SDK or UDK, then it also must have 
a policy that allows for duplication.
With TPM 1.2, it wasn’t possible to create a key that could be duplicated only to 
a few specified new parents and no others. With TPM 2.0, this is now possible using a 
command called TPM2_DuplicationSelect. This command allows you to specify exactly 
which parent (or parents) a key is targeted to be duplicated to. The main reason for using 
this command is in conjunction with PolicyAuthorize. By using PolicyAuthorize, an 
IT organization can change the target backup key for duplication. So if the organization 
normally backs up keys to a specified server, and that server dies, then by signing a TPM2_
DuplicationSelect command that selects a new server, the organization can mail out 
a new signed policy to employees, knowing that they now are allowed to duplicate their 
keys to the new server. This allows the new duplication target without allowing employees 
to back up their keys to their home computers (which may not be trusted).
Figure 15-1. Example key tree
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Because TPM2_Duplicate and TPM2_DuplicateSelect can’t be authorized with a 
password or an HMAC session, in order to duplicate a key, you must first start a policy 
session and then satisfy the branch of the policy that has the TPM2_PolicyCommandCode 
linked with TPM2_Duplicate or TPM2_DuplicationSelect. Then you can execute the 
appropriate command to duplicate the key to a new parent.
USE CASE: A SET OF SERVERS ACTS AS ONE
In this use case, a set of SSL servers acts as a failover for one another or for load 
balancing. the company doesn’t want users to need to know which server they’re 
connected to—it isn’t something users care about. So the company needs the same 
key to exist on all the servers that are being used to service its web page. (this also 
means the company has to get only one certificate for this key, instead of a separate 
key for each server.)
the company creates a duplicable key with a PolicyAuthorize command as 
the policy and then uses the private key associated with the PolicyAuthorize 
command to sign several TPM2_DuplicationSelect commands, each of which 
points to a different server. a user gets this key certified and puts a copy of the 
certificate on each server. the user then duplicates the key from the original server 
to all the other servers, and finally imports the key using TPM2_Import into each of 
the other servers. at this point, all the servers look identical to an outside user.
Steps
1. Create policy p using TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, an enterprise 
public signing key, and a policyRef of SSL.
2. Create a duplicable key using policy p on the initial SSL server.
3. Create restricted storage keys on all the other SSL servers using 
TPM2_Create, and call them SrKi.
4. Use the enterprise private key to sign  
TPM2_PolicyDuplicateSelect, selecting the SrKi public as 
the target of duplication. Do this once for each SrKi.
5. Use TPM2_VerifySignature on the initial SSL server to 
create a ticket for each signed policy. this allows that signed 
policy to be used by the initial SSL server for duplication.
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6. For each policy, create a duplicated key that can be loaded by 
SrKi by doing the following on the initial SSL server:
a. Load the enterprise public signing key using TPM2_Load.
b. Load the SrKi public key into the initial SSL server using 
TPM2_LoadExternal.
c. Use TPM2_StartAuthSession to start a policy session.
d. execute TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect, selecting 
the SrKi of one of the target servers.
e. execute TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, using the policy, a 
policyRef of SSL, and the Ticket corresponding  
to SrKi.
f. execute TPM2_Duplicate, passing it the handle of the 
loaded SrKi public and the handle of the enterprise  
signing key.
g. the result of the TPM2_Duplicate command is an 
encrypted version of the enterprise signing key. Send it to 
the server with SrKi.
h. Import the duplication blob into the server with SrKi.
7. Copy the certificate of the enterprise signing key to that server.
at this point, the key is the same on all the servers and can be used for SSL 
identification and communication.
Key Distribution
In some cases, keys need to be distributed long after a system is initially set up. Being 
able to distribute keys securely is very important in these cases. The TPM design makes 
this easy. When each system is set up, a non-duplicable storage key is generated on the 
system, and a central system keeps a record associating this key with the system name 
(or perhaps the system serial number). This can be done in an Active Directory or LDAP 
database. Additionally, at provisioning time, the local platform gets a public key of the 
central system that corresponds to a signing key. At some later point, if the central system 
wants to distribute an HMAC key to the system, the following takes place:
1. The central IT system creates an HMAC key using  
TPM2_GetRandom.
2. The central IT system encrypts the HMAC key with the public 
portion of the target client’s storage key.
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3. The central IT system signs the encrypted HMAC key with its 
private signing key. This is done so the local platform knows 
that what is being sent is authorized by IT.
4. The encrypted HMAC key is sent to the client along with a 
signature that proves it came from the central IT system.
5. The client verifies the signature on the encrypted key by 
loading the central server’s public key. (This can be done  
with the TPM using TPM2_Load and then using  
TPM2_VerifySignature, if you like.)
6. The client imports the verified, encrypted HMAC key into its 
system using TPM2_Import, getting out a loadable, encrypted 
blob containing the HMAC key.
7. The client loads the HMAC key when the user wishes to use 
it, using TPM2_Load, and uses it as normal. At this point, the 
local platform has received an HMAC key from the IT central 
system that has never been decrypted in the local system’s 
memory.
Key Activation
Because of the ability to create and re-create keys from the seed in the TPM, it’s possible 
to use multiple key templates at provisioning time of a system and have a central IT 
system record the key template and corresponding public portion of the keys associated 
with the system. Central IT can then power cycle the TPM, destroying the system’s copy 
of the key. Thus when the system is distributed to an end user, it doesn’t have any of these 
keys available.
Later, when IT wants to activate those keys, it need only send the key template used 
to create the key to the end user and allow the system to re-generate the key from the 
template using TPM2_CreatePrimary. Note that the key template includes the policy of 
the key so generated, but not the password associated with it, which is chosen whenever 
the key is re-generated. If the central system wishes to avoid the use of that password 
when controlling the key, two bits in the template can be selected: userWithAuth and 
adminWithPolicy. These can be set in such a way as to make the password unable to 
control the key. If userWithAuth is set FALSE, and adminWithPolicy is set TRUE, then the 
password can’t cause the key to perform any functions.2
In using this technique, the templates should be chosen in such a way as to include 
random entropy. Without the template, the key can’t be re-created, so the central system 
can be sure the key isn’t used until the template is received by the client.
2Because these flags are part of the template, if a user tries to change them, the user gets a  
different key.
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There is another way to do key activation, similar to what was possible with  
TPM 1.2: using migratable keys. When a key is duplicated, you can doubly encrypt it: 
once using the parent key of the system to which it’s being duplicated, and once using 
a symmetric key that is inserted when the duplication is done. The produces a key blob 
that is encrypted twice. The outside encryption is gated by the new parent’s private key. 
The inner encryption is done with a symmetric key. In this case, when a TPM2_Import 
command is executed, the TPM must have the private asymmetric key already loaded; its 
handle is given to TPM2_Import, and a secret is passed into the TPM2_Import command as 
a parameter. The secret is used in calculating the symmetric key, which in turn is used to 
decrypt the inner encryption. The command flow is as follows:
1. A duplicable key is generated on a central system.
2. The key is duplicated to the client system using the symmetric 
key option. This parameter is called encryptionKeyIn in the 
TPM2_Duplicate function.
3. The key blob is signed by the central system and sent to the 
client, but the encryptionKeyIn parameter is kept safe by the 
IT administrator.
4. When the IT administrator wishes to allow the key be 
used, encryptionKeyIn is provided to the client system, 
allowing the client system to import it using the TPM2_Import 
command.
Key Destruction
Once a key has been created, it’s sometimes important to be able to destroy it as well. One 
example is if a user is going to sell, surplus, or recycle a computer and wants to make sure 
data that was encrypted on that system with that key is no longer available. TPMs provide 
this facility in a number of easy ways.
If the key used is a primary key, the easiest way to destroy it is to ask the TPM to 
change its copy of the seed of the hierarchy on which it was created (usually the storage 
hierarchy). TPM2_Clear does this for the storage hierarchy. Clearing the TPM destroys all 
non-duplicable keys that are associated with the hierarchy, evicts all keys in the hierarchy 
from the TPM, and changes the seed, preventing any primary keys previously associated 
with that hierarchy from being re-generated. It also flushes the endorsement hierarchy, 
but it doesn’t change that seed.3 Duplicable keys can no longer be loaded into the system, 
although if they have been duplicated to a different system, they may not be destroyed.
3This way, the EK and TPM vendor certificates are still valid.
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If such a drastic step isn’t necessary (perhaps the machine is only going to be loaned 
for a time to a different employee, or multiple employees are using the machine), other 
things can be done, if preparations are made ahead of time. For example, if a primary 
key is generated with secret entropy in the template and then made into a persistent key, 
then the only thing that needs to be done to destroy the key is to destroy the copies of 
the template and evict the primary key from the persistent storage. Once this is done, the 
key is gone and can’t be re-generated. Because there can be multiple trees underneath 
different primary keys, this provides a way to destroy a particular tree of keys without 
destroying all the trees of keys in a TPM. This may be important if multiple users are using 
the same TPM.
It’s even possible to destroy keys that are generated outside the TPM, imported into 
the TPM, and then made persistent. If the copies outside the TPM are destroyed (which 
may be possible if the import was done in a controlled facility), then merely evicting the 
key from persistent memory also destroys the key.
Putting It All Together
This section provides two examples of how different types of businesses might decide to 
manage TPM entities. We start with a simple case, which might apply to a small business, 
and then consider a large enterprise.
Example 1: Simple Key Management
An end user is handling all of their own keys. The user has two systems: a primary system 
and a backup system for backing up keys. Here are the steps the user follows to manage 
the keys:
1. Create an SRK on each system using a standard non-
duplicable key template. Set userWithAuth to TRUE, 
adminWithPolicy to FALSE, and the policy to a NULL policy. 
This means the policy is disabled and the password can be 
used to authorize use of the SRK. The user sets the password 
to a well-known password when using the  
TPM2_CreatePrimary command to create the SRKs.
2. Create a duplicable storage key (DSK) under the SRK on  
the primary system. Use TPM2_Create to create this key.  
It has userWithAuth set to TRUE and adminWithPolicy set to 
TRUE. This allows the password to authorize using the key 
and the policy for duplicating the key. (Remember that keys 
can only be duplicated using a policy.) It has a policy that 
specifically has a branch with TPM2_PolicyCommandCode  
with TPM2_Duplicate selected, together with  
TPM2_PolicyAuthValue. This policy requires the user to  
prove knowledge of the key’s password in order to duplicate it.
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3. Load the public key of the new SRK to which the key is to be 
duplicated.
4. Duplicate this storage key to the backup system by  
creating a policy session, executing TPM2_PolicyCommandCode 
with TPM2_PolicyDuplicate, and then executing  
TPM2_PolicyAuthValue. Then an HMAC session is started 
(using the DSK password). The two sessions are referenced 
when executing the TPM2_Duplicate command, passing it the 
handle of the DSK and the public key of the SRK of the backup 
system. This produces a blob that contains the duplicated key 
and is encrypted in a way that can be imported into the TPM, 
which knows the SRK private portion.
5. Move the blob to the backup system, and use TPM2_Import 
to import the key into the backup system. This produces 
another blob, which can be loaded into the backup system on 
demand.
6. As new keys are created under the DSK on the primary 
system, send copies of those key blobs to the backup system, 
where they can also be loaded using the copy of the DSK, and 
used.
7. To decommission the primary system, use TPM2_Clear, using 
the lockout password to clear the TPM’s storage hierarchy.
8. To migrate all keys to a new system, create an SRK on the new 
primary system.
9. Repeat the process of duplication from step 4. This time, the 
new parent is the SRK of the new primary system.
10. Copy all other keys blobs onto the new primary system.
Example 2: An Enterprise IT Organization with  
Windows TPM 2.0 Enabled Systems
In this case, the enterprise doesn’t want to use EKs that are potentially known outside the 
organization. The enterprise wants to use its own EKs after the machines are provisioned, 
but use the OEM EK to prove to itself that the system is genuine. The organization 
provisions each system as it comes in, as follows:
1. Generate the OEM EK using TPM2_CreatePrimary and the 
TCG Infrastructure Workgroup’s standard EK template. 
Compare it to the vendor EK certificate that came with the 
system. Check the certificate as well, using the vendor’s  
public key.
2. Run TPM2_Clear to wipe the TPM’s storage and EK 
hierarchies.
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3. In a trusted location, evict the OEM EK, ask the TPM for 
a random number, repopulate the EK template with this 
entropy, and read out the EK public portion, making the 
enterprise’s own certificate for this key.
4. Change the storage hierarchy, endorsement hierarchy, and 
dictionary-attack authorization values to random values, 
storing them in an LDAP server.
5. Create a restricted encryption key and make it persistent, for 
use as an SRK. This key has an authorization value of NULL 
and a policy of NULL. This allows anyone to use it who  
wishes to.
6. Create a restricted signing key and make it persistent, for use 
as an AIK. This key also has an authorization value of NULL 
and a policy of NULL, so that TNC software can use it.
7. Store a copy of the SRK’s public key in the enterprise’s LDAP 
associated with this machine.
8. Create a certificate of the AIK that associates it with this 
machine. This certificate is stored both on the LDAP and on 
the system itself.
9. Uses the AIK to quote the current PCR values, and check them 
against golden measurements that came with the system.
10. Change the software load and configuration of the system to 
match the enterprise’s own policies.
11. Use the AIK to quote the current PCR values, and store them 
in the LDAP associated with this system. These are used as a 
new set of golden measurements.
12. Create virtual smartcards on the machine using the TPM, and 
set up the Windows VPN server to accept the certificate of  
this key.
13. Set up another virtual smartcard on the machine using the 
TPM, and set up a Radius server to accept it for connections to 
the enterprise’s wireless network, using WPA2 in  
Enterprise mode.
14. Create a 32-byte NV index, and store a hash of the enterprise’s 
IT organization public key there. The policy of the key only 
allows this same key to be used to write to the index. This key 
will be used later to check software updates before they’re 
installed, to see if they’re approved by IT.
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15. Install Wave software to report the PCR measurements on 
each boot, sending an alert to the IT organization if they aren’t 
correct. (Alternatively, a StrongSwan VPN can be used, which 
doesn’t grant access to the network unless the PCRs pass 
muster.)
16. Create a policy for allowing duplication of a key to the IT 
backup server’s TPM, and store it on the system. This policy is 
signed with the IT private key.
17. The user’s boss provides a policy that allows the boss to use 
the keys in their employee’s absence.
18. When the user gets the system, the user creates a duplicable 
restricted decryption (storage) key, under which the user 
stores all their enterprise keys. The policy the user gives it is 
the OR of the policies in steps 16 and step 17. Before doing 
this, the user checks the policy’s signature using the hash of 
the public key stored in step 14.
19. The user duplicates their duplicable storage key to the IT 
organization’s backup server and then its wrapped keys in 
their normal backup.
20. If the user quits or the machine is to be recycled, use the 
stored owner authorization to send the system a notice that it 
should execute TPM2_Clear, thus wiping all the keys stored on 
the system. The OEM EK is used to restart the process.
21. If the user is moved to a new system or their motherboard 
dies, re-duplicate their backed-up key (stored in step 18) to 
their new system, and copy their other key blobs from backup 
to the new system. The user can then continue working.
Summary
You’ve seen that the facilities of the TPM allow for very sophisticated or very simple key 
management, depending on the needs of the end user. These needs can range from those 
of a paranoid enterprise worried about industrial espionage, including theft of machines, 
to those of a non-paranoid home user, who merely wishes to keep their keys safe on their 
home system. By crafting the key hierarchies and setting up authorizations and policies 
correctly, you can keep keys safe and usable.
